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PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS UNDER NEPA
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 1979, Three Mile Island, the site of Metropolitan
Edison's nuclear reactors, experienced the worst nuclear accident in
American history.' People within five miles of the accident suffered
symptoms of psychological health damage.' There are two nuclear reac-
tors at the Three Mile Island site.3 While the accident occurred at
Metropolitan Edison's Three Mile Island Unit 2, Metropolitan Edison's
Three Mile Island Unit 1 was coincidentally shut down for refueling.'
Before the dormant reactor could be restarted, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) ordered a hearing to determine if the inactive
reactor could be operated safely.5 The NRC invited interested par-
ties to intervene in the hearing.6 People Against Nuclear Engergy
(PANE)7 accepted the invitation to intervene.8 PANE wanted the NRC
to consider the psychological health damage that a restart of the shut-
down reactor would have on people in the vicinity of Three Mile
Island.9 These circumstances raised the issue of whether psychological
1. See People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 678 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
2. The symptoms included increased tension, vulnerability, skin rashes, ag-
gravated ulcers, skeletal problems, and muscular problems. See, e.g., BAUM, GATCHEL,
FLEMING, AND LAKE, CHRONIC AND ACUTE STRESS ASSOCIATED WITH THE THREE MILE AC-
CIDENT AND DECONTAMINATION: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF A LONGITUDINAL STUDY (1981);
BROMET, THREE MILE ISLAND: MENTAL HEALTH FINDINGS (1980); HouTs, MILLER, TOKUHATA.
AND HAM, HEALTH RELATED BEHAVIORAL IMPACT OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR IN-
CIDENT, pt. 2 (1980). See also Brief for Respondent People Against Nuclear Engery, at
3, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
3. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct.
1556, 1558 (1983).
4. Id.
5. Id-
6. Id.
7. PANE is a group of residents from in and around the Three Mile Island
area who oppose the operation of either reactor. Id.
8. Id-
9. Id. PANE actually had two contentions. PANE's first contention was that
the restart of the shutdown reactor would aggravate the physical manifestations from
the psychological stress of the accident by causing more stress. PANE's second con-
tention was that restart of the shutdown reactor would make the community less stable
and cohesive. Id. at 1159 n.2. PANE's second contention is a classical secondary effect.
See infra notes 145 and 151 and accompanying text.
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health effects are cognizable under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).1'
Historically, courts have been reluctant to recognize social aid
economic effects under NEPA.1' Psychological effects are similar to
social and economic effects because they all are indirectly caused by
agency action. Psychological effects are caused indirectly because they
require human perception before they can be realized. While
psychological impacts occur indirectly from agency action just as socio-
economic impacts, psychological impacts are similar to health impacts
because psychological impacts affect human health. The judiciary
readily recognizes human health effects as falling under NEPA.2 This
recognition occurs because NEPA states that the protection of human
health is one of NEPA's primary purposes." Thus, the question arose
whether psychological health effects should be cognizable under NEPA,
as health effects are, or rather should be excluded from such con-
sideration, as socio-economic effects are.14
The United States Supreme Court concluded that psychological
health effects may be cognizable under NEPA,'5 but distinguished the
10. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, S 101-209, 42 U.S.C. §5
4321-4347 (1976).
11. Courts are reluctant to recognize socio-economic effects as being within
NEPA's purview when there is no significant primary impact on the environment from
the agency's action. See, e.g., Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517,
522-23 (5th Cir. 1978) (socioeconomic impacts are to be considered only if there is a
primary impact on the natural environment); Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864,
867 (6th Cir. 1976) (NEPA was not meant to cover social problems like unemployment),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 466 F. Supp.
639, 657 (D. Neb.) (the psychological and sociological effects of a prison on people who
live nearby need not be evaluated under NEPA), affd sub nom. Monarch Chem. Works,
Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979); Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc.
v. Department of Labor, 609 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1979) (social and economic fac-
tors not encompassed by the provisions of NEPA include crime, social services, changed
character of neighborhood), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 367 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973), affd per curiam, 502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974); National Pork Producers
Council v. Bergland, 484 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Iowa), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d
1353 (8th Cir. 1980); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Department
of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Bergland,
428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. S 4321 (1976). One of NEPA's purposes is to "stimulate the health
and welfare of man ...... Id.
14. Compare the cases supra note 11 with the cases supra note 12 to see
the difference in cognizability under NEPA between socio-economic effects and health
effects, respectively.
15. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct.
1556, 1560-61 (1983).
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psychological health effects alleged by PANE, holding that they do
not fall within NEPA's purview because they were not caused by a
change in the physical environment.16 The Court cited the lack of a
proximate causal relation between a change in the physical environ-
ment and the psychological health damages alleged by PANE as
another reason for disallowing PANE's contentions." Thus, the
psychological health effects suffered by residents near Three Mile
Island following the near catastrophe at one nuclear reactor were held
not cognizable under NEPA in connection with the proposed restart
of another nuclear reactor at the same location.
This note explores the purposes and procedures of NEPA to
ascertain when various effects are cognizable under that statute. 8
After exploring the statutory purposes and procedures, there is an
examination of whether NEPA amounts to substantive law for the
purposes of judicial review.19 The discussion then turns to how courts,
prior to Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear
Energy" (PANE), interpreted when the effects of a proposed agency
action must be recognized under NEPA.2' Next, the note outlines the
PANE standard for when psychological health effects fall under NEPAI
and criticizes that standard, showing its effect upon the cognizability of
environmental impacts under NEPA.1 Finally, the note considers alter-
natives to the PANE standard.u
II. NEPA's PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
To understand NEPA, one must understand the purposes and
procedures of the Act. Congress enacted NEPA to protect the en-
vironment.' Section 101 of NEPA establishes a national policy "to
use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain
16. Id- at 1561.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 83-120 and accompanying text.
20. 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
21. See infra notes 121-40 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
23. See infra. notes 175-245 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 217-45 and accompanying text.
25. 42 U.S.C. S 4321 (1976). One of NEPA's purposes is to "promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment ...." Id. See also 115
Cong. Rec. 29,067 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson, the sponsor of NEPA, where he
implied that NEPA would halt the rapid deterioration of the physical environment);
40 C.F.R. S 1500.1(a) (1984) (describing NEPA as a "basic national charter for protec-
tion of the environment").
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conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive har-
mony.... ."I' To implement this policy, NEPA establishes procedures
for federal agencies to follow when considering federal action.Y7 The
main procedure requires that every federal agency prepare an en-
vironmental impact statement 8 (EIS) on "proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affectng the quality of the
human environment ... ." In addition to the EIS requirement, Sec-
tion 202 of NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
to evaluate the federal government's performance in meeting the ob-
jectives of the policy set forth in Title I of the Act." The CEQ also
advises the executive branch concerning additional policies to improve
the environment." Further, the CEQ regulations are to be given es-
tablishment of the CEQ, a national environmental policy, and proce-
dures to implement that policy, Congress intended to assure enhanced
protection of the environment.'
NEPA protects the environment by providing information both
to the public and the decision-making agencies about the effects pro-
posed actions will have on the environment.' This information is pro-
vided by the EIS. An accurate and detailed EIS not only informs the
26. 42 U.S.C. S 4331(a) (1976).
27. See 42 U.S.C. SS 4332-4335 (1976).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). An EIS is a detailed statement which must include
the following:
(i the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. S 4342 (1976).
31. Id.
32. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (ruling that agencies
should give substantial deference to CEQ regulations). See also Note, NEPA After Andrus
v. Sierra Club: The Doctrine of Substantial Deference to the Regulations of the Council
on Environmental Quality, 66 VA. L. REv. 843 (1980).
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. 40 C.F.R. S 1500.1(b) (1984) ("NEPA procedures must insure that en-
vironmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions
are made and before actions are taken."). See also McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies,
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agency of the environmental effects of a proposed federal action, but
also informs the public of such effects. 5 Further, the EIS provides
the court with a record upon which to review the agency's decision.'
Agencies must prepare an EIS for every proposed action "significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. 3' If an agency is
uncertain whether its proposed action requires an EIS, the agency
must prepare an environmental assessment.'
An environmental assessment examines the need for the proposed
action, its likely effects, and all feasible alternatives. 9 Based on the
environmental assessment, the agency either prepares an EIS or makes
a "finding of no significant impact"'" providing reasons why an EIS
is not required. Regardless of whether the agency files an EIS or
a finding of no significant impact, the agency fulfills the informational
purpose of NEPA by producing a documented decision based on con-
sideration of the relevant factors and by providing full public access."
In deciding whether a proposed action requires an EIS, an agency
must determine whether the action crosses the threshold limitations
of section 102(2)(c) of NEPA.'2 Section 102(2)(c) requires an agency to
prepare an EIS for all proposed actions that are "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."'3 The
and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 Tax. L. REV. 801, 803-07 (1977). See also Baltimore Gas
and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246. 2252 (1983)
(the twin aims of NEPA).
35. See McGarity, supra, note 34, at 804.
36. Id. at 807. Judicial review of agency action occurs under S 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1970). See also McDonald, The Relation-
ship Between Substantive and Procedural Review Under NEPA: A Case Study of Scrap
v. U.S., 4 ENVTL. AF'. 157 (1975).
37. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(c) (1976).
38. An environmental assessment is a statement by an agency of the reasons
why an EIS is or is not needed for a proposed action. See 40 C.F.R. S 1508.9 (1984).
The CEQ regulations authorize agencies to classify proposed actions as: routinely re-
quiring an EIS; not requiring an EIS because the proposed action is a categorical ex-
clusion under 40 C.F.R. S1508.4; or possibly requiring an EIS thus requiring an en-
vironmental assessment to determine the need for an EIS. 40 C.F.R. S 1507.3(b)(2) (1984).
39. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.9 (1984).
40. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.13 (1984) (a "finding of no significant impact" means a
proposed action will not significantly affect the human environment so that no EIS
is required).
41. For a more complete discussion of NEPA's informational purpose, that
being public disclosure and informed agency decision-making, see McGarity, supra note
34, at 804.
42. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C) (1976).
43. Id.
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Act limits the expenditure of agency time and resources to proposed
actions where the informational purpose of NEPA is served by the
agency expenditure." The informational purpose of NEPA is served
when the threshold limitations are met. The threshold limitations are
that a proposed action be a major"5 federal action, with a significant
effect, and the effect must be on the human environment. If all of
these factors are present, the agency must prepare an EIS.
In determining the necessity for preparing an EIS, an agency
must evaluate the nature of its proposed action. Initially, the ques-
tion arises whether the "proposal""' qualifies as "federal action."'
"Federal action" includes federal funding where the agency retains
control over use of the funds, approval of specific projects, initiation
of new or revised agency regulations, and adoption of official policy,
formal plans or programs. 8 Failure by an agency to act is also federal
action if it is either judicially or administratively reviewable. 9 There
is no federal action if the agency has no opportunity to make a
decision." If an agency decides that a proposed action qualifies as a
federal action under NEPA, the first threshold requirement is satisfied
in determining whether the agency should prepare an EIS.
Once a determination is made that a proposal is a federal action,
the next requirement is that the effects of the federal action are sig-
nificant. 1 According to the CEQ regulations, both adverse and beneficial
44. See McGarity, supra note 34, at 805.
45. See 40 C.F.R. S 1508.18 (1984). The CEQ regulations state that "major"
has no independent meaning from "significance." The Supreme Court followed this
ruling in Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 364 n. 23 (1979). Compare Hanley v.
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640. 644 (2d Cir. 1972) (not all major federal actions have a signifi-
cant impact), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972), with Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974) (proposing unitary approach of
defining "major" and "significantly").
46. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.23 (1984) (A "proposal" exists when meaningful evalua-
tion of the effects from an agency's manner of attaining a goal may be accomplished).
See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976) (an agency must determine when
a "potential proposal" becomes a "proposal requiring an EIS").
47. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.18 (1984) (defining "federal action" as action where the
Federal Government is in control or is responsible).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding
that there is no federal action and thus no need for an EIS where Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare had ministerial approval under Social Security Act
of capital expenditure by private hospital, approved by state agency, and the Depart-
ment did not plan, promote, or financially fund the project).
51. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C) (1976). A proposed action must have some signifi-
cant effect on the human environment before preparation of an EIS by an agency
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 5
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effects of a proposed action may be significant.2 However, agen-
cies have generally been required to address only adverse effects.'
The CEQ regulations also require an agency to consider the
significance of an effect with regard for both the "intensity," or sever-
ity of the effect, and the "context," or setting of the effect. ' An ef-
fect that is significant locally may be insignificant on a national level.
For example, building a jail in a residential area has significant ef-
fects locally but not nationally. The context and intensity of an effect
are important factors in determining an effect's significance.
is required. Thus, there must be a significant effect to trigger the requirement of
the preparation of an EIS by an agency. Once the agency decides to prepare an EIS,
the EIS must address the severity of all reasonably foreseeable effects. The con-
tent of an EIS is limited by the "rule of reason," that being an agency need only
consider alternatives that a reasonable person would think significant enough to war-
rant discussion. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978). Therefore, a significant effect is required to
trigger an EIS, but once triggered, the scope of the EIS is not limited to significant
effects.
In discussing effects, a number of adjectives are used to describe the effect.
An effect may be either "direct" or "indirect." "Direct" effects occur at the same time
and place as the action while "indirect" effects occur later or more distant from the
action. For example, the direct effect of building a highway is the physical change
of the existence of the highway. The highway may promote other development which
is the indirect effect of constructing the highway. This could also be described as the
"primary" and "secondary" effects respectively. Unfortunately, primary and secondary
have the connotation of more and less important, respectively. Since socio-economic
effects usually occur indirectly from agency action, they are labeled as secondary ef-
fects. As secondary effects, socio-economic effects are thought of as less important
than primary effects.
This misconception that secondary effects are less important than primary ef-
fects has caused some courts to required a significant effect on the physical environ-
ment to trigger an EIS. See supra note 11. Some courts hold that a significant socio-
economic effect, that is secondary effect, cannot trigger the need for an EIS. See infra
notes 136-38 and accompanying text. This note adopts the position that the threshold
limitation to trigger the need for an EIS may be met by either primary or secondary
effects so long as there is a change in the physical environment from the proposed
action. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text. Thus, a change in the physical
environment that causes insignificant primary effects to the physical environment would
trigger the preparation of an EIS if there were signficant secondary effects which
might be socio-economic. This note opposes the view that secondary effects need only
be cosidered in an EIS when there is a significant primary effect on the physical en-
vironment which triggers the EIS requirement. See infra notes 231-35 and accompany-
ing text. See also Note, Psychological Effects of NEPA's Threshold, 83 COL. L. REv. 336,
367 (1983).
52. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.27(b)(1) (1984).
53. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing
federal action in terms of adverse effects only), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). But
see Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. 1981) (beneficial
as well as adverse effects must be treated in an EIS).
54. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.27 (1984) (one of the relevant factors in considering in-
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In addition to context and intensity, another factor in assessing
the significance of an effect is the degree to which a proposed action
will cause more or different adverse environmental effects than those
caused by existing uses." Proposed action that is similar to the ex-
isting uses is less likely to be significant than if the proposed action
is a departure from the existing uses." For example, the construction
of a tall building in New York City is less likely to be significant
than construction of the same building in a small, relatively undevel-
oped town. Therefore, the extent to which the proposed action deviates
from the present use is a relevant factor in determining significance.
In deciding the significance of an environmental effect, the agency
should also consider the quantitative adverse environmental effects
of the proposed action. 7 The adverse environmental effects from the
proposed action must be appraised both individually and cumulatively
for their impact on the environment.58 An adverse environmental ef-
fect that is insignificant by itself may become significant when assessed
with other environmental effects. 9 For example, the air pollution from
a new factory may be insignificant when considered alone, but may
be intolerable when added to the air pollution from other factories
in the area."0 Thus, the cumulative impact, the degree of deviation
from existing uses, the context, and the intensity of an environmental
effect are all relevant factors an agency should consider to determine
if the environmental effect is significant. If information about the ef-
fect is necessary for an informed decision by the agency, the effect
is significant.61
The threshold limitation of significance implies a causal connec-
tion between the agency action and the significant effect.62 This causal
tensity is the severity of the affect to public health or safety).
55. Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973). Hanly dealt with the construction of a jail in New York City across
from two apartment buildings. The court of appeals remanded the case because the
EIS prepared by the General Services Administration was inadequate due to its failure
to discuss risk of increased crime and a possible drug detoxification center at the
jail. Hanley, 471 F.2d at 836.
56. Id. at 831.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. McGarity, supra, note 34, at 848.
62. The direct impact on the physical environment need not be significant
to trigger an EIS. See Note, The Role of Secondary Impacts Under NEPA, 6 ENVTL.
AFF. 127 (1977). See also supra note 51.
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relationship is not a "but for" test of causality," but rather is a
"likelihood" test. If a proposed action "could"65 significantly affect
the human environment, or has the "potential"" to do so, the causal
relationship is sufficient to require an EIS."7 If there is insufficient
likelihood that the agency action will cause a significant effect upon
the human environment, no EIS is necessary. 8
The final threshold requirement to trigger the preparation of an
EIS is met if the significant effect is on the human environment. The
CEQ regulations define "human environment" as "the natural and
physical environment and the relationship of people with that
environment."" Further, the CEQ regulations incorporate the defini-
tion of effects into its definition of human environment"0 so that the
human environment includes the following effects: "ecological,
aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, and health."'" Thus, health
effects are part of the human environment.
Where a proposed action is a major federal action likely to cause
a significant effect on the human environment," NEPA's threshold
requirements for an EIS are met, and the agency must prepare an
EIS. 3 Initially, the agency is concerned with which effects cross
63. The "but for" test is met if the effects in issue would not have occurred
except for the federal action. PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS S 41, 263-72 (1984).
64. Compare Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 382 F. Supp. 362 (D.D.C. 1974)
(holding that an EIS was unnecessary because the "but for" test was not met because
trees could be cut for lumber by big business if not by small business), affd, 539 F.2d
220 (D.C. Cir. 1976) with Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S.
776 (1976) (refusing to use the "but for" test). See also McGarity, supra note 34. at 857-60.
65. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320
(8th Cir. 1974).
66. See Tierrasanta Community Council v. Richardson, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,309,
20,311 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
67. See supra notes 65 and 66.
68. See North Dakota v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D.N.D. 1980) (no EIS
required because environmental effects of legislative proposal for federal and state
cost-sharing on water projects not reasonably foreseeable); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC,
389 F. Supp. 167, 175 (D.D.C. 1974) (where FTC prevented merger of cement manufac-
turers and the supplier of sand and gravel, the conclusion that prevention of the merger
would cause strip mining was too speculative).
69. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.14 (1984).
70. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.14 (1984) (the definition of human environment includes
the definition of "effects" in S 1508.8).
71. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.8 (1984).
72. For a fuller discussion of the definition of "human environment," see Shaw
and Robichaux, Council on Environmental Quality: Defining Human Environment, 16
CAL. W.L. REV. 201 (1980).
73. If an EIS is necessary, the CEQ regulations provide for public and in-
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NEPA's threshold to trigger the preparation of an EIS." After the
agency decides to prepare an EIS, the agency is concerned with which
effects the EIS must include2 The CEQ regulations explain that social
and economic effects cannot by themselves trigger the need for an
EIS."6 However, if an EIS is prepared, the CEQ regulations require
that the EIS include all social and economic effects that are inter-
related with effects on the physical environment." Thus, the human
environment consists of both effects on the physical environment and
socio-economic effects.
Protection of the human environment is the primary purpose of
NEPA18 The EIS is the primary procedure by which NEPA accom-
plishes this purpose." NEPA requires that an agency prepare an EIS
terageney involvement. Agencies must solicit comments on the draft of an EIS from
the public and from appropriate state and federal agencies. 40 C.F.R. S 1503.1 (1984).
The agencies have a duty to comment. 40 C.F.R. S 1503.2 (1984). In appropriate cases,
public hearings or meetings must be held. 40 C.F.R. S 1506.6 (1984). The agency prepar-
ing the EIS must consider the comments made on the drafts EIS, and respond to
the comments in a final EIS. 40 C.F.R. S 1503.4 (1984). If subsequent to filing the final
EIS, the agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action or if new cir-
cumstances or information arise, a supplement to the final EIS must be prepared and
circulated. 40 C.F.R. S 1502.9 (1984).
Section 102 of NEPA directs agencies to enforce the policies and procedures
of NEPA to the "fullest extent possible." 42 U.S.C. S 4332 (1976). This phrase has
been interpreted to mean that an agency may avoid the provisions of NEPA only
when compliance is impossible due to a conflict with another statute. See Flint Ridge
Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 791 (1976) (requiring clear con-
flict of statutory duty). See also 40 C.F.R. S 1500.6 (1984).
For an explanation of the judicial review of threshold decisions by an agency
concerning the necessity of an EIS, see Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of
Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 63
(1980).
74. There must be a significant effect on the human environment to trigger
the necessity to prepare an EIS. See supra note 51.
75. This has to do with the scope of the EIS, that is the range of effects
the EIS will cover. See 40 C.F.R. S 1508.25 (1984). See also supra note 51.
76. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.14 (1984).
77. Id. The CEQ regulations only say that socio-economic effects cannot by
themselves trigger an EIS. Id. The regulations do not address the issue of whether
a primary significant effect on the physical environment is necessary to trigger an
EIS. Thus, the regulations do not preclude an insignificant primary effect on the physical
environment being coupled with a significant secondary effect from a proposed action
to satisfy the threshold to prepare an EIS. Id. See also supra note 51.
78. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text. That the primary purpose
of NEPA is to protect the human environment is implied in the fact that the main
procedure of NEPA, the EIS, is triggered by significant effects on the human en-
vironment. See also supra, note 13 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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for proposed agency action that is federal action likely to cause a
significant effect on the human environment.' The EIS is the means
by which the informational purpose of NEPA is satisfied."' Moreover,
NEPA's ultimate goal of protecting the human environment is attained
by requiring informed agency decision-making.'
III. NEPA'S SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND
While it is a clear purpose of NEPA to protect the human envi-
ronment through its procedural requirements, the question arises
whether NEPA contains any substantive law along with its procedural
law.' The standard of review for agency decisions under NEPA is
discussed first." Next, recent Supreme Court decisions will show the
direction the Court is taking in this area." The final discussion in-
volves the importance of the issue.so
While section 102 s1 of NEPA contains the procedures to imple-
ment the policies of section 101," the Act is void of any reference
to judicial review. 9 Suppose an agency complies with the procedures
of NEPA by filing an EIS for a proposed action with severe environ-
mental effects. In spite of the severe environmental effects, the agency
decides to go ahead with the proposal. The question is whether the
reviewing court is restricted to looking at whether the agency followed
the correct procedures, or whether the reviewing court is allowed to
consider whether the agency adequately balanced the priorities in
deciding to proceed with the proposal."
The standard of review for non-adjudicatory procedures by agen-
cies under NEPA is given in the case of Citizens to Preserve Overton
80. See supra notes 42-77 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 2541 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
87. 42 U.S.C. S 4332 (1976). See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
88. 42 U.S.C. S 4331 (1976). See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
89. 42 U.S.C. SS 4321-4347 (1976) (NEPA does not discuss judicial review).
90. The distinction being made is between procedural review and substan-
tive review. Suppose an agency decides not to prepare an EIS for a proposed federal
action. If on review the court finds fault for the agency's inadequate discussion of
reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, the court reverses on procedural grounds.
However, if the court finds fault with the value an agency gave a particular alter-
native that the agency considered in deciding not to prepare an EIS, the court reverses
on substantive grounds.
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Park, Incorporated v. Volpe."' The Overton Park test finds all agency
action judicially reviewable except where Congress expressly prohibits
judicial review, or where a statute is so broad that there is no effec-
tive law to apply." Congress does not expressly prohibit judicial review
in NEPA 3 If the policies and purposes found in section 101 of NEPA
which protects the human environment are not too broad to be con-
strued by courts as constituting no applicable law under the Overton
Park test, NEPA may allow for substantive judicial review of agency
action. If NEPA allows for substantive judicial review of agency ac-
tion, the standard of review under Section 701 of the Administrative
Procedure Act94 is whether the agency action was "arbitrary and
capricious."9 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the requirements of NEPA are essentially procedural."
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether NEPA af-
fords substantive review in the case of Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Incorporated v. Karlen.9 The case dealt with the site for a
low-income housing project financed by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that environmental factors, such as the con-
centration of low-income housing into an area, should be given deter-
minative weight.99 In reversing, the Supreme Court held that NEPA
only requires consideration of environmental consequences by an
agency."'
One could argue that the Supreme court limited NEPA to pro-
cedural law in Strycker's Bay. However, in a footnote, the Court noted
that it might recognize substantive law in NEPA if an agency acted
in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner.' In Strycker's Bay, the Court
91. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
92. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)
(dealt with the Secretary of Transportation's decision to fund a state highway through
a park when federal law prohibited such action if reasonable alternatives existed).
93. See supra note 89.
94. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 701-706 (1976).
95. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971)
(the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is the most deferential to an agency because
the agency must act in a manner that is clearly wrong to violate the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard).
96. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
97. 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam).
98. Id. at 223-24.
99. Id. at 227.
100. Id.
101. "If we could agree with the dissent that the Court of Appeals held that
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held that the agency had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously."° Thus,
Strycker's Bay held that a reviewing court may not raise environmen-
tal concerns over other legitimate concerns under NEPA."3
The Supreme Court gave its most recent holding on judicial
review under NEPA in Baltimore Gas and Electric Company v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Incorporated.' In that case, the
Natural Resources Defense Council questioned the assumption of the
NRC in licensing a nuclear power plant; the NRC assumed that the
storage of the spent fuel from the reactor would have no significant
impact on the environment because technology would be developed
to safely store the waste."'5 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia on review held that the NRC had acted "arbitrarily and
capriciously" in its estimation of the uncertainty as to storing the
hazardous waste from the reactor.' The Supreme Court reversed.' 7
The Court held that the NRC had not acted "arbitrarily and
capriciously.""' Further, the Court invoked the rule that agencies must
be given great deference when acting within their area of expertise.'"
The Court cautioned that agencies must take a "hard look" at the
environmental consequences of proposed action but held they need
not give priority to environmental concerns over other appropriate
considerations." The role of a reviewing court under NEPA is not
to decide how the agency should have ruled."' Instead, the Court held
that the role of a reviewing court is to make sure that the agency
adequately considered and disclosed the environmental effects of
federal actions and that the agency decision is not arbitrary and
capricious."
In view of the Court's discussions of arbitrary and capricious agency
actions under NEPA, it appears that substantive judicial review under
HUD had acted 'arbitrarily' in redesignating the site for low-income housing, we might
also agree that plenary review is warranted." Id. at 228.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 227. See also Note, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions Under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969-Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc.
v. Karlen, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79 (1982).
104. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
105. Id. at 2249-52.
106. Id. at 2252.
107. Id. at 2258.
108. Id. at 2249.
109. Id. at 2256.
110. Id. at 2253.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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NEPA still exists."' While the Court theoretically recognizes substan-
tive judicial review under NEPA, it has refused to overturn any
agency action or decision on substantive grounds under NEPA. 4 Thus,
the Court has not brought substantive NEPA review out of the
theoretical and into the practical. With the Court's present deference
to agency expertise and its essentially procedural interpretations of
NEPA, the Court is not likely to find that an agency acted arbitrarily
and capriciously such that substantive judicial review under NEPA
becomes a reality."5
In order to protect the human environment, however, it is impor-
tant that NEPA have substantive judicial review. Without substantive
law, NEPA becomes merely procedure which informs the agency and
the public of a proposed action's potential harm to the human environ-
ment. If the agency chooses to institute the proposed action after con-
sidering the harm to the human environment, the courts are powerless
to prevent the agency from doing so unless NEPA has substantive
law. While it is true that the public will be informed of the proposed
agency action, the action may be completed and the human environ-
ment harmed before the public can organize to prevent the harm. In-
formation concerning the potential harm is useless in protecting the
human environment if an agency may consider it without being forced
to adjust its actions accordingly. Substantive judicial review under
NEPA would give the courts the power to protect the human environ-
ment by insuring that agencies give the proper consideration to en-
vironmental concerns."'
NEPA seems to meet the Overton Park test such that NEPA
allows substantive judicial review of agency action."7 The Supreme
Court recognizes substantive judicial review under NEPA as theo-
retically existing."8 However, the Court has never upheld the reversal
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980)
(per curiam). See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. See also Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
115. The reluctance of the Supreme Court to recognize substantive judicial
review makes it more likely that district courts will find an EIS inadequate rather
than overturn an agency decision on substantive grounds. This is because the appellate
courts are more likely to reverse a district court that overturns an agency decision
on substantive grounds than a district court that rules the agency EIS is inadequate.
116. There is a tension between a court giving deference to the expertise of
the agency and substituting the court's priorities for the agency's priorities in the
decision.
117. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
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of an agency's decision on substantive grounds."9 If NEPA is to accom-
plish its purpose of protecting the human environment, NEPA must
have substantive judicial review."
IV. THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
PRIOR TO PANE
The human environment encompasses both physical and socio-
economic aspects that may be affected by proposed agency action.
While it was clear before PANE that significant effects on the physical
environment triggered an EIS, it was not clear that significant socio-
economic effects could trigger the need for an EIS when the significant
socio-economic effects were not accompanied by significant effects on
the physical environment. Courts were reluctant to require an EIS
in these instances.'2' In the past, courts charactized socio-economic ef-
fects as "unquantifiable,"'' as outside the ecological limits of NEPA,'
and as lacking association with a significant primary effect on the
physical environment.2 '
Because socio-economic effects are not easily quantified, courts
have allowed their exclusion from an agency's determination whether
to prepare an EIS.12 In Hanly v. Kleindienst,"' the General Services
Administration decided not to prepare an EIS based on the environ-
mental assessment of the proposed action. The proposed action was
the construction of a federal jail across from two apartment buildings
119. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978);
Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977);
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon,
466 F. Supp. 639 (D. Neb.), affd sub nom. Monarch Chem. Works. Inc. v. Thone, 604
F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979).
122. See Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973). See also infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
123. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978).
See also infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
124. See Como-Falcon Community Coalition v. United States Dept. of Labor,
609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). See also infra notes 136-38
and accompanying text.
125. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973). See also Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044,
1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Hanly and holding that objective analysis of sociological
and psychological effects is difficult), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
126. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
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in New York City." The Hanly court found that the plaintiff's allega-
tions were based on personal distaste for living near a jail instead
of factual disagreements with the agency's environmental assess-
ment."8 In dicta, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit doubted whether the socidlogical and psychological effects on
neighbors of the jail could be measured.'29 Because non-ecological ef-
fects are difficult to measure, they were not required in agency deter-
minations of whether an EIS is necessary.' 3
Parallel to the view that socio-economic effects are nonquantifi-
able is the theory that NEPA is directed toward the natural environ-
ment as opposed to socio-economic effects."' This theory suggests that
NEPA's aim is in preventing environmental effects such as pollution
or depletion of natural resources, 3 2  but not effects such as
unemployment13 or the influx of low-income people into an area."' To
127. Hanly, 471 F.2d at 826.
128. Id. at 833. The General Services Administration prepared an environmen-
tal assessment stating that no EIS was required because there were no significant
environmental impacts. Id.
129. The court of appeals did not have to address the issue of sociological and
psychological effects of a jail on local residents because there was already a jail in
the community. Id. at 833. However, the court of appeals did remand the case to the
General Services Administration for its failure to consider the possibility of increased
crime and for its inadequate discussion of the non-resident out-patient observation pro-
gram. Id. at 834.
130. The fact that non-ecological effects are difficult to measure is not a
legitimate reason for agencies to exclude them from a determination of whether to
prepare an EIS because NEPA expressly directs agencies to consider effects that are
difficult to measure, 42 U.S.C. S 4331(b) (1976), and to develop procedures to give these
effects proper consideration, 42 U.S.C. S 433221(B0 (1976). Examples of non-ecological
effects are aesthetic, historic, economic, cultural and social effects. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.8
(1984).
131. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th cir.
1978) (the reduction in force at a military base is not an effect on the natural environ-
ment, and thus cannot trigger an EIS under NEPA); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees
v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (the importance of secondary ef-
fects under NEPA is their possible indirect effect on the "resource base").
132. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir.
1978) (NEPA's primary concern is with physical environmental resources); National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (the
importance of secondary effects under NEPA is their possible indirect effect on the
"resource base").
133. See Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864, 867 (6th Cir. 1976) (the en-
vironmental goals of NEPA do not include social problems like unemployment), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
134. See Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (The court feared that someone could
argue that the influx of low-income people into an area could technically be considered
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avoid the danger that NEPA would be used to prevent the influx
of "undesirable" people into a neighborhood,1" courts have defined
NEPA as being concerned with the natural environment.
Stemming from the theory that NEPA's concern is with the
natural environment is the view that in order for socio-economic ef-
fects to be within NEPA's purview, they must be accompanied by
a primary significant effect on the physical environment." Under this
view, socio-economic effects cannot trigger the need for an EIS no
matter how severe they might be unless there is also some primary
significant effect on the physical environment."37 Accordingly, socio-
economic effects should be included in an EIS only if there is a primary
significant effect on the physical environment which triggers an EIS.-'
By requiring a primary significant effect on the physical environment
to trigger an EIS, this view emphasizes NEPA's concern with the
natural environment.
an impact on the environment because an influx of people increase the noise, sewage,
and traffic of a community. Thus, allowing socio-economic effects to trigger an EIS
would allow the use of NEPA to prevent the influx of people into the area.).
135. Id.
136. See Como-Falcon Community Coalition v. United States Dep't of Labor,
609 F.2d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 1979) (where the only change in the physical environment
is the reconditioning of existing buildings for use as a jobs center, socio-economic ef-
fects are not cognizable), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Image of Greater San An-
tonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978) (absent an impact on the physical
environment, the reduction in force at a military base is insufficient to trigger an
EIS); Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864, 866 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1061 (1977) (an EIS need address factors other than physical environmental effects
only when there is an effect on the physical environment); Nucleus of Chicago
Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 231 (7th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976) (the sociological factors concerning an influx of people into a community
are insufficient alone to require an EIS); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 466
F. Supp. 639, 656 (E.D. Neb.) (no consideration of secondary impacts required where
correctional facility will have no direct significant effect on the physical environment).
aTid sub nom Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th cir. 1979); James
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 538 F. Supp. 704, 709 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (socio-economic
effects are insufficient to trigger preparation of an EIS where there are no significant
impacts on the physical environment).
137. Id.
138. See Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d
378, 388 (2d Cir. 1975) (requiring an EIS to assess the emotional response to isolation
for tenants in a proposed apartment complex above a postal facility); National Ass'n
of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (requiring
inclusion of socio-economic effects when an EIS is triggered by a significant primary
effect on the environment). But see Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam) (density of low-income housing is an environmental
effect); McDowell v. Schlessinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W. D. Mo. 1975) (requiring an EIS
for the socio-economic effects of closing a military base in the absence of any signifi-
cant primary effect on the physical environment); Tierrasanta Community Council v.
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While courts have been reluctant to define socio-economic effects
as environmental effects capable of triggering an EIS, courts have
been less reluctant to define health effects as environmental effects
capable of triggering an EIS. 3' Psychological effects seem similar to
socio-economic effects because they too generally occur indirectly from
agency action. Moreover, psychological effects seem similar to socio-
economic effects because psychological effects are subjective and re-
quire human perception before they can be realized. However, psycho-
logical effects are also health effects because they affect the well-being
of humans. Since psychological effects are similar to socio-economic
effects, a court might not allow a significant psychological effect to
trigger an EIS. However, since psychological effects are also health
effects, a court might hold that psychological effects can trigger an
EIS. In Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear
Energy (PANE),"' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of when
psychological effects are cognizable under NEPA.
V. PANE's STANDARD
PANE'' stemmed from the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island.
On March 28, 1979, while Metropolitan Edison's Three Mile Island
Unit 1 (TMI-1) was inoperative for refueling, Metropolitan Edison's
Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) caused the worst nuclear acci-
dent in American history.' The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Richardson, 6 ENVT REP. CAS. (BNA) 1065 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (requiring an EIS for the signifi-
cant effects of a federal youth facility in a planned residential area even though the
ecological effects were not significant).
139. See Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Watt, 13 ENVTL.
L. REP. 20,174, 20,175 (D. Or. 1982) (requiring an EIS for health risks posed by herbicide
spraying); National Pork Producers Council v. Bergland, 484 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Iowa),
'rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir. 1980) (striking a rule by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture allowing the increased sale of uncured meat because of the poten-
tial public health effect in spite of the fact that the rule had no other environmental
aspect).
140. 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
141. Id.
142. People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PANE v. NRC]. The
accident began when the pumps which supply water to the steam generators did not
operate. Without water, there soon would be no steam. Therefore, the automatic safety
system shut off the steam turbine. The temperature and pressure within the reactor
began to rise. A relief valve opened allowing steam and water to drain out of the
reactor and onto the floor of the containment building. The reactor scrammed because
of the rise in pressure, which means the reactor halted nuclear fission so that pressure
within the reactor coolant system could drop. While the panel light indicated that
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(NRC) ordered TMI-1 to remain inactive until a proceeding to insure
its safe operation could be held."3 People Against Nuclear Energy
(PANE), an organization of local residents, intervened in the TMI-1
restart proceeding."' PANE contended that the NRC should consider
both the psychological distress to individuals and the harm to the com-
munity as a whole in an EIS before deciding to restart TMI-1.1" In
a split decision, the NRC ruled that psychological distress and com-
munity deterioration need not be assessed in deciding whether to
restart TMI-1. "
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that psychological effects are cognizable under
NEPA."7 The court reasoned that since health effects are cognizable
under NEPA, and since psychological effects are health effects,
psychological effects must be cognizable under NEPA."5 The court
limited the inclusion of psychological effects within NEPA's purview
to cases of "post-traumatic" anxieties. " 9 Thus, the court of appeals
excluded any possible future claims of fear of increased crime, reduced
property values, or changed neighborhood character by a plaintiff hop-
ing to prevent the influx of people into an area.' The court viewed
the relief valve had closed, the relief valve remained open allowing water to drain
from the reactor. As much as two-thirds of the reactor core was uncovered. This was
a near nuclear core meltdown. This is a very brief summary of the accident taken
from THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
ISLAND, THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI (1979).
143. PANE v. NRC, 678 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
144. Id. The NRC asked interested parties to respond before it made a deci-
sion on the restart of TMI-1. PANE accepted the invitation. Id.
145. Id. at 224. PANE argued that the accident at TMI-2 caused anxiety and
fear in people in the community which manifested itself in physical disorders like skin
rashes and ulcers. To allow restart of TMI-1 after the accident at TMI-2. PANE con-
tended, would aggravate the psychological stress incurred by the people around Three
Mile Island. PANE contended that this psychological distress was cognizable under
NEPA, and the NRC should therefore consider it in an EIS. Id. at 226-27. The NRC
licensing board agreed with PANE that the NRC should consider psychological distress
in deciding whether to restart TMI-1. Id. at 224.
146. Id. at 224-25.
147. Id. at 229.
148. Id. at 229-30.
149. Id. at 229. The court of appeals uses "post-traumatic" psychological health
effects to describe the psychological aftermath that the residents near Three Mile
Island suffered after the accident. To be "post-traumatic," psychological effects must
occur after a very threatening event. Id. at 228. A war, a flood, a nuclear accident,
and an earthquake would all be examples of events threatening enough to cause
psychological effects on the public at large. Thus, "post traumatic" restricts the inclu-
sion of psychological effects to very unique events. Id. at 229.
150. Id. at 229. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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PANE's contention that restart of TMI-1 would cause deterioration
of the community as a classical secondary effect which need only be
considered if an EIS was found to be necessary."' The court then
classified the psychological effects caused by the restart of TMI-1 as
post-traumatic anxieties cognizable under NEPA."'
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals."' The Supreme Court held that the
NRC need not consider PANE's contention of psychological distress
under NEPA."1 In reversing, the Court reasoned that the court of
appeals failed to consider the relationship between the change in the
physical environment caused by the restart of TMI-1 and the psycho-
logical effects alleged by PANE. 5- According to the Court, whether
an effect is cognizable under NEPA depends upon the existence of
a change in the physical environment.S Since the psychological
distress which PANE alleged resulted from the risk of a nuclear acci-
dent, the Court held that NEPA did not recognize PANE's psychological
distress. Risk of an accident is not a change in the physical environ-
ment.'5 Therefore, the Court held that NEPA did not recognize
PANE's psychological distress because it did not stem from a change
in the physical environment."'
The Supreme Court stated an additional reason for disallowing
PANE's psychological distress under NEPA. For an environmental
151. PANE v. NRC, 678 F.2d at 230. The court of appeals remanded the case
to the NRC so that the NRC could determine if a supplement EIS was required for
the restart of TMI-1. Id. at 235. Since the original EIS prepared when TMI-1 went
into operation contained accurate information, the NRC must prepare a supplemental
EIS only if the original EIS could be significantly improved with current information.
An agency must file a supplement to the original EIS if "the agency makes substan-
tial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or
if there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental
concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts." 40 C.F.R. S 1502.9(c) (1984).
While the threshold for a supplemental EIS is different than the threshold for an
EIS, this difference is not crucial to determining if and when psychological effects
are cognizable under NEPA.
152. PANE v. NRC, 678 F.2d at 229-30.
153. PANE, 103 S. Ct. at" 1563-64.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1560.
156. Id. at 1561. "To determine whether S 102 requires consideration of a par-
ticular effect, we must look at the relationship between that effect and the change
in the physical environment caused by the major federal action at issue." Id.
157. Id. at 1561-62.
158. Id. at 1561. The changes in the physical environment from the restart
of TMI-1 include releases of low-level radiation, increased fog in the Harrisburg area,
and the release of warm water into the Susquehanna River. Id.
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effect to be cognizable, NEPA requires a "reasonably close causal rela-
tionship between a change in the physical environment and the btfect
at issue."'6 9 In the chain of causality between the restart of TMI-1
and the health effects of psychological distress, risk of an accident
at TMI-1 and people's perception of that risk are necessary middle
links.' The Supreme Court held "that the element of risk lengthens
the causal chain beyond the reach of NEPA. '61 According to the
Supreme Court, agencies need not consider the effects of risk qua
risk under NEPA.'1 Since PANE's contention of psychological distress
is an effect of risk of a nuclear accident, it was held to be too remote
to fall within NEPA."'
In PANE, the Supreme Court defined "environmental effect"
within the context of NEPA.1" There are two requirements for an
effect to qualify as an environmental effect under NEPA.'I First, there
must be a change in the physical environment which produces the
effect in question.' Second, there must be a "reasonably close causal
relation" between the change in the physical environment and the
159. PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1561. "This requirement is like the familiar doctrine
of proximate cause from tort law." Id.
160. Id. at 1562.
161. Id. The Court stated that risk is part of the price people pay to live in
an advanced society. Id.
162. Id. at 1563. "If a harm does not have a sufficiently close connection to
the physical environment, NEPA does not apply." Id.
163. Id. The Supreme Court drew a distinction between considering effects
that will occur if a risk is realized, which an agency must consider, such as the effects
of an actual accident at TMI-1, and effects caused by the risk of an accident which
the agency need not consider, such as the psychological effects alleged by PANE. Id.
at 1561 n.9.
164. 1d. at 1561. The Court uses general language applying to all effects to
define an "environmental effect" under NEPA. Thus, the language of the Court does
not restrict the PANE standard to psychological health effects. PANE is the standard
to determine if an effect is an environmental effect, thereby falling under NEPA.
To detemrine whether 5 102 requires consideration of a particular
effect, we must look at the relationship between that effect and the change
in the physical environment caused by the major federal action at
issue ....
Our understanding of the Congressional concerns that led to the
enactment of NEPA suggests that the terms 'environmental effect' and
'environmental impact' in S 102 be read to include a requirement of a
reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical en-
vironment and the effect at issue.
Id. at 1561. The language of the Court shows that the Court intended to define all
environmental effects cognizable under NEPA.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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effect in question." 7 If an effect meets these two requirements of
PANE, the effect is an environmental effect under NEPA.U
The Supreme Court gave several reasons for defining environ-
mental effect under NEPA so as to exclude PANE's psychological
distress. First, the Court believed that in NEPA Congress intended
to protect the environment by concentrating on the physical environ-
ment.'9 Thus, NEPA should not be expanded to include agency action
which has no effect on the physical environment.7 ' Secondly, the Court
was concerned that agencies would not be able to function efficiently
167. Id.
168. The importance of an effect meeting the PANE standard is its being defined
as an environmental effect. As an environmental effect, an effect is cognizable under
NEPA. Thus, an effect that is defined as environmental has the capability of trigger-
ing an EIS. Therefore, the significance of the PANE standard is in defining what ef-
fects trigger the need for an EIS.
While the main significance of PANE is in defining the effects that trigger an
EIS, PANE will also determine the content of an EIS. An effect which does not meet
the PANE definition of an environmental effect will not have to be included in an
EIS. Suppose the proposed action is building a nuclear reactor. PANE stands for not
allowing psychological health effects from the fear of risk of an accident to trigger
an EIS. PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1563. See also id. at 1561 n.9. PANE also excludes these
psychological health effects from NEPA's definition of environmental effect. Id. at
1561-62. Thus, even if an EIS is prepared for the proposed reactor, the content of
the EIS need not include psychological health effects from the fear of a risk being
realized because these psychological health effects are not environmental effects under
NEPA. PANE held that the effects of risk need not be addressed. Thus, PANE will
affect the scope of an EIS as well as the effects that may trigger an EIS.
169. PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1560-61. The Court's intention to protect the environ-
ment by emphasizing the physical environment is apparent in the following passage.
NEPA does not require the agency to assess every impact or effect
of its proposed action, but only the impact or effect on the environment
.... But we think the context of the statute shows that Congress was
talking about the physical environment-the world around us, so to speak.
NEPA was designed to promote human welfare by alerting governmen-
tal actors to the effect of their proposed actions on the physical environ-
ment ....
Thus, although NEPA states its goals in the sweeping terms of
human health and welfare, these goals are ends that Congress has chosen
to pursue by means of protecting the physical environment.
Id.
170. Id. By expanding NEPA to include agency action that has no effect on
the physical environment, NEPA would be expanded to include minimum wage pro-
posals and medicare cutbacks. These are examples of agency actions taken in response
to economic pressures. They affect people, but not the physical environment. However,
if NEPA did not require that the agency action have some effect on the physical en-
vironment, NEPA would require an EIS for all proposed agency action with signifi-
cant effects including minimum wage proposals and medicare cutbacks. Ridiculous as
that may seem, that is the result if NEPA is not limited to agency actions which
have some effect on the physcial environment.
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if psychological distress caused by risk was cognizable under NEPA. 1
The Court's fear was that agencies would have to develop psychiatric
expertise.17 ' The necessity for psychiatric expertise might reduce
agency resources below the necessary level to adequately protect the
physical environment."' Finally, the Court believed that opening the
door to psychological stress from risk would allow disagreements with
the policy behind proposed federal action to enter under the guise
of fear. 7' For these reasons, the Supreme Court defined "environmen-
tal effect" so that it excluded PANE's psychological distress.
VI. EFFECTS OF PANE STANDARD
The PANE standard is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First,
the PANE standard is too restrictive because it excludes from NEPA
the psychological distress from the fear of a high-consequence risk
occurring.15 Second, the standard inappropriately distinguishes health
effects from environmental effects.171 Third, the PANE standard will
lead to an arbitrary determination of which effects from a proposed
action fall within NEPA. 177 Finally, the PANE standard invokes the
theory of proximate cause, which is not suited to the purpose of
NEPA.Y78 For these reasons, the PANE standard is inadequate.
The effect of PANE on psychological distress is clear. For
psychological distress to be cognizable under NEPA, the psychological
distress must be from a proposed federal action which causes a change
171. Id. at 1562.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1563. "It would be extraordinarily difficult for agencies to differen-
tiate between 'genuine' claims of psychological health damage and claims that are
grounded solely in disagreement with democratically adopted policy." Id. For exam-
ple, if psychological stress from risk were cognizable under NEPA, psychological stress
from fear of risk of increased crime would also be cognizable. Id. at 1562. Thus, it
would be possible for a plaintiff to claim psychological stress from the fear of increased
crime in an attempt to block the construction of a jail in his neighborhood. The Court
believed that attempts to frustrate political policy could not be separated from legitimate
psychological distress claims. Id.
There are three responses to the Court's position. First, courts routinely look
behind the intent of the parties to distinguish between legitimate and insincere claims.
Second, the agency need not attach any particular weight to the psychological effects.
Finally, there will probably be overriding benefits which in fact outweigh the
psychological effects, such as the utility of the federal action.
175. See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 206.07 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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in the physical environment, and must be proximately related to the
change in the physical environment."9 This is a broad standard in the
sense that it may recognize psychological health effects under NEPA.
It is narrow, however, in the sense that it is extremely difficult for
psychological health effects to meet the requirements of PANE. PANE
excludes from NEPA's purview all psychological distress caused by
risk." ' Thus, PANE prevents the recognition, under NEPA, of the
psychological distress from the fear of a low-probability event that
would cause severe consequences if the event occurred. 8'
An illustration of how PANE may exclude from NEPA's
cognizability the psychological distress resulting from fear of an event
is provided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in City
of New York v. United States Department of Transportation." In that
case, the Department of Transportation (Department) attempted to
route the shipment of hazardous waste by highway through New York
City.'0 The Department's route conflicted with a New York City reg-
ulation prohibiting the transportation of large quantities of radioactive
material through densely populated areas.'" The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the Depart-
ment should have considered the psychological effect on the public
of routing large quantities of hazardous waste through the city.'85 The
district court reasoned that the transportation of hazardous waste is
the type of low-probability, high-consequence '" event which would
arouse public anxiety.87 The court of appeals reversed the district
179. PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1561. See supra notes 147-73 and accompanying text.
180. PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1563. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
181. Events which have a low-probability of occurring but if they occur have
severe consequences are referred to as "low-probability, high-consequence" events. Ex-
amples of such events are an accident at a nuclear reactor or the transportation of
hazardous waste through a city. See New York City v. United Dep't of Transp., 539
F. Supp. 1237, 1273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983). cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1403 (1984).
182. 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403 (1984).
183. 715 F.2d at 737.
184. Id. The New York City ordinance prohibited the transport of certain
radioactive materials and large quantities of all radioactive material through the City.
See N.Y.C. Health Code S 175.111. The ordinance made an exception for emergency
situations which the Commissioner authorized. Id. The Department ruled that the City's
ordinance was consistent with federal law and the Department's own regulations. 43
Fed. Reg. at 16,954 (1978).
185. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp.. 539 F. Supp. 1237,
1273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd. 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403
(1984).
186. See supra note 181 for a definition of low-probability, high-consequence
event.
187. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 539 F. Supp. 1237,
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court on this issue, holding that ". . . the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that fear is not a cognizable environmental impact under
NEPA."I"
As this case illustrates, PANE's effect is to exclude from NEPA's
purview all psychological health effects resulting from fear of an event
occurring. However, it is the fear of the possible occurrence of a
catastrophic event that is most likely to cause psychological distress.
By considering psychological distress from the fear of the risk of a dis-
astrous event occurring, the agency could reduce the fear of the
public. " This consideration would also allow the public to inform the
agency of the public's willingness to accept a particular risk.," The
Supreme Court's refusal to recognize as within NEPA the psycholog-
ical stress from the fear of risk means that the public must endure
the fear associated with the risk of a catastrophic event occurring
without the opportunity of informing the agency of their willingness
to bear the risk.
By excluding psychological health effects from the fear of risks
being realized, the Supreme Court excluded an essential part of what
it means to be human from the human environment. The purpose of
NEPA is to protect the human environment. 9 ' Humans are obviously
a part of the human environment. Fear which causes psychological
stress is a human emotion.'" Fear is then an essential part of being
human. Thus, fear is a part of the human environment. Therefore,
when the Supreme Court excluded from NEPA the recognition of psy-
chological stress caused by the fear of a risk being realized, the Court
1273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403
(1984).
188. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 751
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403 (1984). Actually, the Supreme Court held
that fear of risk is not cognizable under NEPA. See supra notes 159-63 and accompa-
nying text. The fear experienced by people after a risk is realized would fall under
NEPA. For example, the fear experienced by the public if an accident at a nuclear
reactor occurred would be cognizable under NEPA. Thus, an agency would have to
consider the fear that results if a risk is realized. See supra note 163.
189. See Note, supra note 51, at 375 ("Truly unwarranted fears may be alleviated,
for example, by involving the public in the decision process.").
190. Kellman, Anxiety Over the TMI Accident: An Essay on NEPA 's Limits of
Inquiry, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 219, 251-52 (1983).
191. One of the primary purposes of NEPA must be to protect the human
environment because the threshold for an EIS is only concerned with "effects on the
human environment." 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C) (1976). See supra note 13.
192. Flugel, MAN, MORALS AND SociETY: A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY 304 (1945).
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excluded an essential part of being human from the human environ-
ment.
If psychological health effects from the fear of risk may be ex-
cluded from cognizability under NEPA, other health effects could also
be excluded. 13 PANE applies to all environmental effects not just
psychological health effects.'" The PANE standard distinguishes be-
tween health effects and environmental effects.'95 By emphasizing the
requirement of the PANE standard that there be a change in the
physical environment, 96 health effects could be excluded from
cognizability under NEPA. 97
The following hypothetical illustrates how health effects could
be excluded from recognition under NEPA."8 Suppose the Forest Serv-
ice intended to spray a particular herbicide in a forest to control
vegetation. While the herbicide has caused no adverse health effects
to humans in the past, there is conflict in the scientific community
as to whether the herbicide will cause adverse health effects to humans
who come in contact with it. 99 Use of the herbicide is the proposed
action. It produces the physical change of destruction of vegetation."'
193. See Comment, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy
and the Cognizability of Psychological Stress Under NEPA: A Stress Test for the United
States Supreme Court, 1983 DE'T. C. L. REV. 943, 961 (1983).
194. See supra note 163.
195. Dougherty, The Application of NEPA to Agency Actions Affecting Human
Health, 13 ENV'T L. REP. 10,179, 10,185 (1983). This is a curious distinction. Humans are
part of the environment. Health effects affect humans. It seems impossible to say health
effects are not part of the environment.
196. A court would emphasize the requirement that there be a change in the
physical environment by requiring a signficant primary effect on the physical environ-
ment before the need for an EIS is triggered. This note refers to this approach as
the restrictive alternative. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
197. See Comment, supra note 193, at 961 (This Comment sets forth a
hypothetical of a technology which does not affect the physical environment but is
disastrous to human health).
198. This example is modeled after Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Bergland,
428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977).
199. In the actual case, some of the herbicides to be used contained dioxin
which is now known to be very toxic to humans. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v.
Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D. Or. 1977). The uncertainty as to whether the her-
bicide produces health effects is important. If the herbicide was known to cause adverse
health effects, then most courts would require an EIS. See supra note 139.
200. This note assumes that use of the herbicide is the proposed action. It
also assumes that destruction of vegetation is the change in the physical environment
from use of the herbicide. Finally, the note assumes that the destruction of vegetation
is not a significant effect capable of triggering an EIS. This is a crucial assumption.
If the destruction of vegetation was significant enough to trigger an EIS, the EIS
would have to address the possibility of adverse health effects.
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Any adverse health effects would not stem from the change in the
physical environment; that is, destruction of vegetation. Instead, any
adverse health effect would stem from the use of the herbicide; that
is, the proposed action. The health effects are not a change in the
physical environment. Therefore, the health effects cannot trigger the
need for an EIS because they fail the PANE requirement of having
some association with a change in the physical environment."' Since
the destruction of vegetation is not a significant primary effect on
the physical environment, it cannot trigger the need for an EIS."'
Thus, the potential health effects of the herbicide will not be con-
sidered because they are not environmental effects under PANE. By
emphasizing the requirement of a change in the physical environment,
health effects could be placed outside of NEPA's reach."
This hypothetical also shows how the proximate cause require-
ment of PANE excludes health effects from cognizability under NEPA.
In the hypothetical, the health effects are the effects in issue under
PANE. The destruction of vegetation is the change in the physical
environment."' The reasonably close causal relationship between the
change in the physical environment and the effect in issue is lacking
here. The health effects in the herbicide example fail the proximate
cause requirement of PANE. Thus, the health effects are not en-
vironmental effects.2 5
Some might argue that use of the herbicide will cause the change in the physical
environment of an increased amount of the herbicide in the environment. The adverse
health effects then seem to stem from a change in the physical environment. The health
effects also seem to be proximately related to the change in the physical environ-
ment. This note did not follow an approach that identifies the proposed action as a
change in the physical environment because the Supreme Court did not follow such
an approach in PANE. In PANE, restart of the nuclear reactor was the proposed ac-
tion. The changes in the physical environment were increased radiation, release of
warm water, and fog. The Supreme Court could have followed the approach of deter-
mining whether the proposed action is a change in the physical environment because
an operational nuclear reactor is certainly a change in the physical environment from
an inoperative one. However, the Supreme Court did not. Had the Court followed
the approach that the proposed action is a change in the physical environment, Pane's
psychological health effects also seem to stem from and be proximate in relation to
a change in the physical environment.
201. The health effects do not stem from a change in the physical environ-
ment, nor are the health effects themselves a change in the physical environment.
Therefore, the health effects fail PANE's requirement that there be a physical change
in the environment.
202. See supra note 196 and 201.
203. See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
204. See supra. note 200.
205. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text for the PANE definition
of an environmental effect.
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This proximate cause requirement of PANE will result in ar-
bitrary decisions as to which health effects are environmental effects.
The arbitrariness results because one cannot predict when a court
will find the requisite proximate cause between a change in the phys-
ical environment and the health effect in issue. This arbitrariness is
inherent in proximate cause."0 ' By incorporating proximate cause into
NEPA, the Supreme court incorporated an arbitrary standard that
calls into question which effects are cognizable under NEPA.
In addition to the arbitrariness of proximate cause, the purpose
of proximate cause does not correspond with the purpose of NEPA.
The purpose of proximate cause is to look at a defendant's past acts
to determine whether the defendant should reasonably have foreseen
the results of his acts to establish his liability."8 At trial, the fact
finder looks at the defendant's past acts to see which risks fall within
the ambit of foreseeability. 9 Proximate cause looks at the past events
to limit liability to foreseeable effects as a matter of public policy.""
The purpose of NEPA is to look into the future to inform the public
and decision-making agency. " NEPA is not concerned with past acts
or limiting liability on the basis of public policy. 12 NEPA and prox-
imate cause have divergent purposes, and therefore, they should not
be intertwined.
The PANE standard is an unsatisfactory standard for several
reasons. First, it uses proximate cause analysis which produces arbi-
trary decisions as to what is an environmental effect. ' Secondly, the
purpose of proximate cause does not coincide with the purpose of
NEPA. 14 Moreover, the PANE standard draws a distinction between
206. Dougherty, supra note 195, at 10,185. See supra notes 159-63 for a discus-
sion of PANE's distinction between health effects and environmental effects.
207. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 42, 249-50 (1971).
208. Id. at 250-51. See Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S.
469, 475 (1876).
209. PROSSER, supra note 207, at 267-70.
210. Id. at 257.
211. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
212. The Supreme Court seems to acknowledge the divergent purposes of NEPA
and proximate cause. "On the contrary, NEPA is not directed at the effects of past
accidents and does not create a remedial scheme for past federal actions. It was enacted
to require agencies to assess the future effects of future actions." PANE, 103 S. Ct.
at 1563. The Supreme Court used proximate cause to limit the extension of NEPA,
that is to prevent NEPA from being used to delay a proposed federal action on the
basis of political disagreement. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text for the
Court's reasons.
213. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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health effects and environmental effects. 15 Finally, the PANE stan-
dard excludes psychological distress from fear of a high-consequence
risk occurring"6 while there is an alternative standard that does not.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PANE STANDARD
Three alternatives to the PANE standard may be advanced that
avoid incorporating proximate cause theory" ' in deciding what effects
are environmental, thereby triggering preparation of an EIS. The
broadest alternative would require any federal action with significant
effects upon humans to trigger the need for an EIS. 18 In contrast,
the most restrictive alternative would require an EIS only when there
is a significant primary impact on the physical environment.2 9 Between
these two extremes, a moderate approach would trigger preparation
of an EIS for any significant effect associated with a direct impact
on the physical environment.'s The moderate alternative best serves
NEPA's purpose of protecting the human environment."1 Thus, the
moderate alternative is preferable to the PANE standard.'
The first alternative is the broadest standard. This alternative
would require an EIS for all federal action having significant effects
upon the human environment regardless of whether there is any effect
on the physical environment. Under this alternative, a federal action
with no direct effect on the physical environment but with a significant
effect upon the human environment would trigger the need for an
EIS." This broad standard would place all federal action with signifi-
cant effects under NEPA.SU However, this standard would extend
215. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
217. Proximate cause is not necessary to prevent the expansion of NEPA to
all federal actions, with significant effects on humans. See infra notes 236.48 and ac-
companying text.
218. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 236.42 and accompanying text.
223. The broad standard defines human environment as including humans. Thus,
any federal action significantly affecting humans is an environmental effect capable
of triggering an EIS under NEPA.
224. Under this broad alternative, federal action with no direct effect on the
physical environment triggers the need for an EIS under NEPA if the federal action
significantly affects humans. While minimum wage proposals or medicare cutbacks have
no direct effect on the physical environment, they affect humans significantly. Thus,
minimum wage proposals or medicare cutbacks could trigger an EIS under the broad
standard. This is an obvious misapplication of NEPA. See supra note 170 and accom-
panying text.
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NEPA beyond its intended reach."5
To prevent the expansion of NEPA into unintended areas, the
restrictive standard requires that the direct impact on the physical
environment be significant to trigger the preparation of an EIS. In-
direct impacts which are socio-economic in nature cannot trigger the
preparation of an EIS absent a significant direct impact on the physical
environment.' Under this view, a low-probability 6vent that has
severe consequences if it occurs, such as the transportation of hazar-
dous waste, escapes triggering an EIS because there is no significant
direct impact on the physical environment."5 Where the consequences
are severe if a risk is realized, the public will have the most interest
in expressing a willingness to accept or reject the risk involved."2
However, the public will not be able to inform the agency of the
public's concern about the risk because the restrictive standard does
not require an EIS for the low-probability event that has severe con-
sequences if it occurs. The agency is then making a decision on the
proposed action without having all the necessary information before
it.= Thus, the restrictive standard does not serve the informational
purpose of NEPA when applied to low-probability events that have
severe consequences if realized.
The best approach moderates between the two extreme alter-
natives. This moderate alternative has any direct change in the physi-
cal environment triggering the preparation of an EIS if there is a
significant effect, whether direct or indirect, on the human environ-
ment. 1 This means that an insignificant direct effect on the physical
225. See supra note 224.
226. See Dougherty, supra note 195, at 10,186.
227. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
230. The New York City v. United States Department of Transportation case
exemplifies this. 539 F. Supp. 1237, (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403 (1984). See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
In that case, the Department of Transportation decided to route hazardous waste by
highway through New York City. The alternative method of transport was barging.
Barging the nuclear waste cost more than transportation by highway. Barging was
also more likely to cause an accident. However, if an accident occured in barging,
the consequences to humans would not be as severe as if an accident occurred in
highway transport. The public has a grave interest in determining whether the risk
of a severe consequence by highway transport should be imposed upon them when
the risk could be avoided by barging the hazardous waste instead. The public's senti-
ment should be a very significant factor in the agency's decision of which form of
transport to use. Unfortunately, the public did not get to inform the agency of its
preference.
231. See Note, supra note 51, at 363-77 (that Note incorporates proximate cause
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environment from a proposed agency action would trigger the neces-
sity for an EIS if the proposed action would have any significant ef-
fect on the human environment. Since the moderate approach does
not require a significant direct effect on the physical environment to
trigger the preparation of an EIS, the moderate approach requires
preparation of an EIS for significant indirect effects which previously
did not trigger the preparation of an EIS. 2
Application of the moderate standard to the New York City v.
Department of Transportation' case illustrates this point. While the
change in the physical environment from the routing of hazardous
waste through New York City is insignificant,' the public's fear of
the risk of an accident and the severe consequences therefrom could
be very significant. The moderate standard requires the agency to
consider the indirect effect of the public's fear of a risk to determine
if the indirect effect is significant to trigger the preparation of an
EIS. Thus, the moderate standard ensures an informed agency deci-
sion by requiring that the agency consider whether the public's fears
are significant to trigger an EIS. The moderate standard also allows
the public to enter the agency decision-making process of risk
into its theory of when an EIS is triggered under NEPA as opposed to the approach
taken by this note). This note discusses how the moderate standard relates to trigger-
ing the need for an EIS. The moderate standard only controls the content of an EIS
to the extent that the moderate standard defines what an environmental effect is dif-
ferently than other standards do. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. For exam-
ple, the PANE standard does not require an EIS to include the psychological stress
from the fear of risk. However, the moderate standard would allow psychological stress
from the fear of risks to trigger an EIS. Therefore, the moderate standard would
also require an EIS to address the significance of psychological stress from the fear
of risk if an EIS were prepared. The EIS must address the significance of psychological
stress from the fear of risk even if the psychological stress did not trigger the EIS.
The content of an EIS must address all the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
the reasonable alternative to a federal action. The EIS must address all these reasonably,
foreseeable consequences explaining why they are or are not significant.
232. For example, socio-economic effects have generally not been allowed to
trigger an EIS when not accompanied by significant direct effects on the physical
environment. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. The moderate standard
requires an EIS for significant indirect effects accompanied by a direct change in the
physical environment. As an example, a proposed housing complex is a direct change
in the physical environment. The moderate standard would require an agency to con-
sider the indirct effects such as increased noise, sewage, traffic congestion, and pollu-
tion from the influx of people to see if any of the indirect effects are significant enough
to trigger an EIS.
233. 639 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983). See
supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
234. Changes in the physical environment include increased traffic and air
pollution.
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allocation.m Thus, the moderate standard best serves the informational
purpose of NEPA.
In addition to serving the informational purpose of NEPA, the
moderate standard prevents NEPA from being expanded to areas
NEPA was not intended to cover.' The moderate standard does this
by requiring some direct effect on the physical environment to trig-
ger an EIS. ' Hence, proposals for federal action which do not have
a direct effect on the physical environment cannot trigger an EIS re-
gardless of the significance of the resulting effects. 8 Since the
moderate standard effectively limits the application of NEPA without
the use of proximate cause, proximate cause is unnecessary.
In addition to the fact that the moderate standard does not use
proximate cause, there are several other reasons why the moderate
standard is preferable to the PANE standard. First, the moderate
standard requires that the agency consider whether low-probability
events that cause severe consequences if they occur are significant
to trigger the preparation of an EIS." The PANE standard does not."'
Second, the moderate standard does not make health effects distinct
from environmental effects as does the PANE standard.ul Finally, the
moderate standard serves the informational purpose of NEPA better
than the PANE standard by ensuring informed agency decision-
making.242 For these reasons, the moderate standard is more appro-
priate than the PANE standard.
235. It is significant in the New York City case that an alternative to highway
transport was barging. The public could indicate which risk they prefer to accept.
Thus, the agency would allow the public into the decision-making process of risk alloca-
tion. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
236. Examples of areas NEPA was not intended to cover are minimum wage
proposals and medicare cutbacks. See supra notes 223.25 and accompanying text.
237. The range of the moderate standard is limited by the definition given
to "change in the physical environment." This should be given a broad definition to
promote the informational purpose of NEPA, that being informed decision-making. For
example, closing a military base has the direct change in the physical environment
of a change in land use. Regardless of whether buildings are destroyed, the use of
the land is a direct change of the physical environment from the proposed closing.
However, the moderate standard does have bounds. See infra note 238.
238. An example of a proposal which has no direct effect on the physical en-
vironment is a minimum wage proposal. The direct effect of a minimum wage pro-
posal is on the economy not the physical environment. See supra notes 223-25 and
accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
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DISTRESS UNDER NEPA
Two objections could be raised to the moderate standard. First,
one could argue that the moderate standard broadens NEPA so that
it is no longer manageable within the limited agency resources.' 3 Sec-
ond, one could object to the moderate standard on the grounds that
NEPA loses its ability to protect the environment because the mod-
erate standard broadens NEPA. The second objection is based on the
belief that courts would be reluctant to apply the moderate standard
due to its imagined manageability problem. Hence, courts would in-
crease the significance requirement of the threshold determination of
when an agency must prepare an EIS. Since the threshold to trigger
an EIS would be more difficult to meet, some federal actions which
before fell under NEPA would now not do so. Thus, the environment
would receive less protection under the moderate standard than it
did before.
The answers to both objections are found in the informational
purpose of NEPA. NEPA tries to ensure that agencies make informed
decisions. In accomplishing this purpose, agencies incur expense and
delays. The additional expense and delays are necessary to anticipate
potential environmental harm from agency action. The benefits of pre-
venting the harm in the long-run outweigh the costs in the short-run.2
Thus, agencies must incur the short-term costs to carry out the infor-
mational purpose of NEPA. Moreover, it is questionable how much
greater the short-term costs would be under the moderate standard.
Agencies gain expertise as they deal with difficult effects. Until agen-
cies gain such expertise, they can employ experts to assess difficult
effects. Thus, the overburdening of agencies by the moderate stan-
dard seems doubtful. There is then no reason for courts to shun the
moderate standard by making the EIS threshold determination of sig-
nificance higher. The moderate standard merely requires agencies to
consider all the potential significant effects from a proposed agency
action in deciding whether to prepare an EIS.4 5 In so doing, the
moderate standard serves the informational purpose of NEPA without
overburdening agencies.
243. The Supreme Court made this objection in PANE. "Time and resources
are simply too limited for us to believe that Congress intended to extend NEPA as
far as the Court of Appeals has taken it .... The scope of the agency's inquiries
must remain manageable if NEPA's goal of 'ensur[ing] a fully informed and well con-
sidered decision,' [cite omitted], is to be accomplished." PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1562.
244. See Note, supra note 51, at 360 n.149 (citing hazardous waste control and
asbestos as examples of inadequate anticipation of environmental harm that now are
very expensive problems to solve).
245. The agency need only consider if the effects of a proposed action are signifi-
cant enough to trigger an EIS. The moderate standard does not require that the agency
attach a particular weight to the effects in determining whether to prepare an EIS.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of NEPA is to protect the human environment.
NEPA accomplishes this purpose by requiring agencies to prepare
an EIS for major federal action that significantly affects the human
environment. The EIS ensures informed agency decision-making and
public disclosure of environmental effects. Thus, NEPA protects the
human environment by requiring agencies to consider the environmen-
tal effects of their proposed actions before impelementing them.
In PANE, the United States Supreme Court defined when an
effect is an environmental effect such that it is cognizable under
NEPA. There are two requirements for an effect to fall within NEPA's
purview. First, the effect must stem from some change in the physical
environment. Secondly, the effect must be in a reasonably close causal
relationship to the change in the physical environment. The Court
defined an environmental effect in this manner to prevent the expan-
sion of NEPA beyond its intended purpose and to prevent the over-
burdening of agencies.
The PANE standard is an unsatisfactory standard to determine
when an agency must prepare an EIS. First, the PANE standard ex-
cludes all psychological stress from fear of a high-consequence risk
occurring. Secondly, the PANE standard draws a distinction between
health effects and environmental effects which could lead to the ex-
clusion of health effects from NEPA consideration. Moreover, it uses
proximate cause analysis which produces arbitrary decisions as to what
is an environmental effect. Finally, the purpose of proximate cause
does not reflect the informational purpose of NEPA.
Alternatively, a moderate standard is more appropriate than the
PANE standard. The moderate standard triggers an agency to prepare
an EIS for any significant effect from federal action if there is a direct
change in the physical environment. The moderate standard does not
use proximate cause. Further, the moderate standard requires that
an agency consider whether the fear of a risk is significant enough
to necessitate an EIS. Thus, the moderate standard best serves the
informational purposes of NEPA. Finally, the moderate standard does
not overburden agencies or expand the purpose of NEPA beyond its
intended reach. Because the moderate standard serves the informa-
tional purposes of NEPA and allows the public a voice in its will-
ingness to accept risk, the moderate standard should replace the
PANE standard in defining when an effect is cognizable under NEPA.
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